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The millennium's first elections will be marked
by an electronic grassroots revolution. Use of the
internet as a medium for political expression has
exploded,' with more and more of the electorate
engaged in interactive democracy. For voters,
grassroots organizers, candidates and political
consultants, today's internet has become the architectural embodiment of First Amendment free
speech values-the World Wide Web, a virtual
town square.
It is indeed the architecture of the internet that
guarantees accessibility to and equality within the
new media's democratic forum. Equally important to internet activists, however, is the absence
of government regulation. Though the realization
of political action is as close as one's home computer, some fear that the promise of the new media could be smothered by government regulation. In November 1999, the Federal Election
Commission ("FEC") published a Notice of Inquiry
that posed questions and solicited public comments regarding future regulation of internet political activity.2 The public's response was over-

whelming. More than 1,200 comments from
individuals, internet service providers ("ISPs"),
* Karl J. Sandstrom currently serves as Commissioner at
the Federal Election Commission. He earned a B.A. at the
University of Washington, a J.D. at George Washington University and an L.L.M at Georgetown University Law Center.
Janis Crum is currently an associate in the Public Law and
Policy Section of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld in
Washington, D.C. She earned a B.A. at the California State
University, Sacramento, and a J.D. at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law. The opinions in this article are those of the authors and should not be attributed to
the Federal Election Commission.
I
See National Political Index (visited Feb. 7, 2000) <www.
politicalindex.com> (listing 594 "Political Activist" sites; 123
"Political Party" sites; and 376 "Political Newsgroup" sites);
Martha T. Moore, Beginning Today, Clinton and Dole Clash on
Internet, USA TODAY, July 10, 1996, at 7A (reporting that
more than 2000 political websites were active during that

political fundraisers, political websites, political
parties and grassroots advocacy organizations
were submitted to the FEC. 3 Though the agency
has not formally reviewed the comments, many
counseled against FEC regulation of internet political speech.
This collective call for regulatory restraint
comes in the wake of the Supreme Court's invalidation of the Communications Decency Act in
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union.4 In this
landmark decision, the Court announced its commitment to protect internet expression from government regulation by employing a "medium-specific" mode of analysis and the most rigorous
standard of constitutional review. 5 By aggressively
safeguarding the new media with the constitutional armor of strict scrutiny-rather than solely
focusing on the type of speech in question-the
Court's analysis raises provocative questions about
the legitimacy of existing laws and regulations as
they relate to speech made over the internet. Reno
has the power to undermine earlier decisions upholding government restrictions on speech, casting a long shadow over much of its First Amend6
ment jurisprudence.
election year).
2 See Use of the Internet for Campaign Activity, Notice of
Inquiry and Request for Comments, 64 Fed. Reg. 60360 (Nov.
1999).
3 See Public Comments: Use of the Internet for Campaign Activity (visited Feb. 7, 2000) <www.fec.gov/internet.html>.
4 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
5 See id. at 844, 863, 870, 885.
6
See e.g., Kathleen Sullivan, First Amendment Intermediaries
in the Age of Cyberspace, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1653, 1671 (1998)
(arguing, inter alia, that the central tenets behind Brandenburg v. Ohio and New York Times v. Sullivan are undermined by
the effects of the internet's architecture: "The instantaneous
and decentralized global transmission of information arguably weakens a key premise of Brandenburg's imminence re-

quirement."). See also
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This article explores the impact of the Reno
analysis on an earlier Supreme Court opinion regarding corporate political speech. Specifically,
we argue that the Court's reasoning in Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commercev loses its currency
when applied to corporate political communications exchanged over the internet.
We begin with a brief overview of the Court's
decision in Reno, focusing on the "medium-specific" analysis." This is followed by a discussion of
the Court's opinion in Austin upholding restrictions on political speech by corporations. 9 The final section describes the inherent conflict between the analyses employed in these two cases
initiated by Reno's focus on the internet's architectural characteristics. Specifically, these characteristics include accessibility, interactivity (the necessity of "affirmative steps" by the user), and the
ability to achieve "relative parity among speakers."'' Considered individually or taken together,
the new media's characteristics must reshape our
understanding of the Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence. We explore the effect of Reno on
Austin, and argue that the analytical framework
used in Austin to justify restrictions on corporate
political speech loses its power when applied to
speech transmitted over the internet.
I.

RENO V ACLU ANALYSIS DRIVEN BY
ARCHITECTURE"

In Reno, 12 the plaintiffs brought a First Amendment facial challenge to certain provisions of the
Abrams' argument that the internet's architecture undermines the relevance of the Pentagon Papers case:
Today there's a way to ensure that the government never
has a compelling interest in ...suppress[ing] a publication. If The New York Times wanted to publish the Pentagon Papers today, it could simply . . . leak them to a
Usenet News group ... The need for the constitutional
protection would be erased because the architecture of
the system gives anyone the power to publish, quickly

and anonymously.
Id. Cf Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Shielding Children and
Transcending Balancing, 1997 S. CT. REV. 141, 157 (1997)
(noting that Reno "will be of extremely limited precedential

value").
7 494 U.S. 652 (1989).
8 Reno, 521 U.S. at 863.
9 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 652.
10 Reno, 521 U.S. at 863.
11 The authors note that the Reno analysis did not contemplate the rapid evolution of internet-related technologies
and applications. The analysis here is similarly based on internet capabilities as we know them today. The authors rec-

Communications Decency Act ("CDA"), a federal
statute prohibiting the transmission of obscene or
indecent internet communications to individuals
younger than eighteen years old. 13 Many commentators feared that the Court would impose a
less scrutinizing standard of review for the internet, similar to that applied to "scarce" broadcast media; "invasive" radio communications; or
time, place and manner zoning restrictions. 14 Fueling these fears, the government argued that
cases such as FCC v. Pacifica15 and Renton v. Playtime Theatres'6 were particularly relevant in evaluating the CDA. 17 The Court disagreed.
Instead, the Court focused on the internet's
unique architecture, distinguishing this "new media" from traditional channels of mass communication."8 The opinion immediately identified
"four related characteristics of internet communication [that] have a transcendent importance,"
including (1) its "low barriers to entry," (2) identical barriers for both speakers and listeners, (3)
"astoundingly diverse content," and (4) accessibility to "all who wish to speak... creat[ing] a relative parity among speakers." 19 As the "most participatory form of mass speech yet developed," the
Court granted the internet the "highest protec20
tion from governmental intrusion."
By highlighting these architectural factors, the
Court anticipated its "medium-specific" analysis of
the CDA's regulation of the internet-a mode of
analysis that begins with an examination of why
this medium's architecture should dictate the
constitutional standard of review, rather than iniognize,

however,

that

the architectural

features

of to-

morrow's new media will be dramatically different than
today's.
12
Reno, 521 U.S. at 859-62.
13 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 223 (a)(1), (d) (1994 & Supp. I11
1997).
14 See, e.g., Jerry Berman & Daniel Weitzner, Abundance
and User Control: Renewing the Democratic Heart of the First
Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media, 104 YALE LJ. 1619
(1995); Donald E.Lively, The Information Superhighway: A First
Amendment Roadmap, 35 B.C.L. REv. 1067, 1075-82 (1994).
15 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding an FCC order that radio stations could be fined for broadcasting George Carlin's
monologue of "Filthy Words").
16
475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding a zoning ordinance to
keep adult movie theaters out of residential neighborhoods).
17 Reno, 521 U.S. at 844 (citing Brief for the Appellants at
20-22).
18
Id. at 849-50.
19 Id. at 863.
20

/d.
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tiating an inquiry into the category of speech that
the government seeks to restrict. 2 1 In other words,
the Court first decided that its obscenity and indecency cases "provide no basis for qualifying the
level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be
applied to this medium,"2 2 thereby inviting intense constitutional scrutiny to restrictions on the
23
medium itself.

Looking to the architecture of the internet, the
Court factually distinguished the "new media"
from the "old" in three different ways. First, the
Court noted that the "long history of extensive
regulation" of broadcast media does not exist with
the internet. 24 It therefore, rejected the government's claim that the Court's analysis should reflect that used in broadcast cases like FCC v.
Pacifica.2 5 Relying on the self-fulfilling argument
that broadcast media has historically received "the
most limited First Amendment protection" and
that the Federal Communications Commission
"had been regulating radio stations for decades,"
the Court easily distinguished the CDA. "Neither
before nor after enactment of the CDA have the
vast democratic fora of the internet been subject"
to such heavy regulation. 26
The second distinguishing factor was broadcast
media's reliance on spectrum scarcity. 2 7 The scarcity argument loses its relevance in the internet
context, the Court noted, because "the internet
can hardly be considered a 'scarce' expressive
commodity." 28 It provides 'relatively unlimited,
low-cost capacity for communication of all
kinds. "29
Finally, the Court distinguished the invasive
character of other media.30 In Pacifica, for exam21
22
23

See id. at 849-53.
Id. at 870.
See Volokh, supra note 6, at 144 ("If the CDA could

have been seen as limited to 'low-value' speech, the Court
could have let the government prevail while theoretically im-

posing little sacrifice of free speech, because the burdened
speech would be (by hypothesis) not very valuable."). For the
court's current obscenity standard, see Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), which defines the modern obscenity

test as follows: (a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interests; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. See id.
24
Reno, 521 U.S. at 866-68.
25
438 U.S. at 749. In Pacifica, the Court upheld an administrative order that would have penalized a radio station
for broadcasting comedian George Carlin's "Filthy Words"

ple, government regulation was justified in part
because of the government's compelling interest
in protecting children, particularly those children
who might turn on the radio in the afternoon and
"be taken by surprise" by George Carlin's monologue of "Filthy Words." 3 ' Conversely,
"[c]ommunications over the internet do not 'invade' an individual's home or appear on one's
computer screen unbidden... Moreover, the risk
of encountering indecent material by accident is
remote because a series of affirmative steps is required to access specific material." 32 Unlike radio
and television, the internet allows users to select
the material they want to see and to ignore the
33
images they seek to avoid.
To the Court, not only did the internet lack the
regulatory history or inherent character that
might justify regulation, but it also exhibited an
34
architecture that argued against it.
The in-

ternet's speech-enabling character shifted the
Court's focus from merely striking down an overly
broad statute to liberating a new medium. 35 What
easily could have been a narrow decision became
an occasion for the Court to embrace a new technology by identifying distinct architectural features. Specifically, these include (1) accessibility;
(2) interactivity and the need for users to take "affirmative steps" to receive communications, and
(3) parity. 36 Each of these features guided the
Court in its struggle to analyze and differentiate
one medium from another, to determine how to
regulate actors' behavior within this new medium,
and to ascertain whether government regulations
37
either promote or discourage free speech.
The identification and differentiation of the inmonologue during an afternoon time slot because the government had a strong interest in protecting children from
hearing the broadcast. See id.
26
Reno, 521 U.S. at 866-68.
27
28
29
30

See id. at 868-69.
Id. at 870.
Id.

See id.at 868.
Id. at 844 (citing FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726-30
(1978) and Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC,492 U.S.
31

115, 128 (1989)).
32
Reno, 521 U.S. at 869.
3- See id. at 855.
See id. at 849-52.
See id. at 869-72.
36 Id. at 844, 849-53.
37 See LEssIG, supra note 6, at 183 ("[A] rchitectures could
differ both in the values they embrace and in the regulability
of behavior within their space. [Additionally], as the example
of broadcasting shows, architectures differ in the justifica34
35
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ternet's unique architecture persuaded the Court
to construct a new legal regime that imposes a
new obstacle for government restrictions on
speech. By designing an analytical framework
from the internet's architectural blueprint, Reno
erected two constitutional hurdles that the government must overcome in order to prove that restrictions on internet speech are justified. The
first hurdle is the medium-specific internet analysis, which guarantees the "highest protection from
governmental intrusion. '"38 Second, the govern-

ment faces the Court's traditional First Amendment analysis, where the level of scrutiny is determined by the category of speech at issue. just as
Reno held that different communications media
receive varying degrees of constitutional protection, certain forms of speech are entitled to more
constitutional protection from government regulation than others. Obscenity receives no protection; indecency and commercial speech receive
limited protection, while political expression is
39
granted the strongest protection.
While Reno does not directly alter the basic First
Amendment analysis-where the category of
speech dictates the level of scrutiny a government
regulation receives-it constructs an almost bulletproof constitutional "shield" surrounding internet speech. The Court's delineation of the internet's unique architectural features was not
merely "fact finding," but an articulation and illustration of how the new media should be considered the perfect purveyor of core First Amendment values.

sue. The government's defense of the CDA was
not problematic merely because of the statute's
infringement on "valueless" speech, but some
"fully protected speech based on its content,
[within] a fully protected medium."41 Thus, "the conflict that might require hard trade-offs between a
precious constitutional right and a compelling
government interest was ...

42
in fact absent."

These "hard trade-offs" certainly arise in the application of Reno to internet political speech. The
right to engage in and exchange political dialogue in the conduct of a political campaign is entitled to the "fullest and most urgent application"
of the constitution. 43 The most difficult case,

therefore, is one in which political speech-the
most highly protected category of speech recognized under the First Amendment-is exchanged
within the most highly protected medium. This is
precisely the point where Reno meets Austin.
As discussed below, the Reno-Austin conflict is
exacerbated by the Court's underlying rationale
in both cases, invalidating speech restrictions in
Reno, but upholding restrictions on corporations'
core political speech in Austin. We now turn to a
discussion of how Reno's analysis subverts the rationale used in Austin in the context of a corporation's use of the internet to engage in political
speech.
CORPORATE POLITICAL SPEECH IN
THE SHADOW OF RENO: AUSTIN
UNRAVELED

II.

40

This is why the sweep of Reno's protection appears to be so broad. The Court's analysis is premised on the notion that the internet's architecture is a model of constitutional values and First
Amendment aspirations. Only as a secondary matter does it consider the category of speech at is-

In its landmark decision Buckley v. Valeo,4 4 the
Supreme Court upheld the Federal Election Campaign Act's 45 contribution limits, but invalidated
limits on independent and candidate expendi-

tions of regulation that they entail"); see also LAWRENCE

REV. 1163 (1999). Wu argues that the court should refine its
analysis in future internet communications cases by focusing
discretely on the application. See id.
41
Volokh, supra note 6, at 146.
42
Id. at 148.

TRIBE,

2D. ED. 1005-06 (1988)
(noting that the court's "prevailing legal policy" for electronic media "has been one of fair and universal access to the
facilities of the 'common carriers'").
AMERICAN

38

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw,

Reno, 521 U.S. at 863.

tures. 46 Drawing a "line between expenditures

and contributions, [the Court] treat[ed] expendi-

43

Nixon v. Shrink Missouri PAC, _

U.S.

__,

120 S. Ct.

See Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principlein the
First Amendment, 43 U. CHi. L. REv. 20 (1976); TRIBE, supra

897, 903 (2000) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, 15 and Monitor

note 37, at 940 n.80 (noting that the court has "treated differently the several media of expression" and "has at times tolerated differential treatment of entire classes or categories of
protected expression such as the political and the commercial" (internal citations omitted)).
40
For a critique of the court's sweeping analysis, see
Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85 VA. L.

424 U.S. 1 (1976).
2 U.S.C. § 431 et. seq.
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13. The 1974 FECA amendments included an aggregate limit on candidate expenditures, a ceiling of $1000 on independent expenditures (payments made by individuals or organizations on behalf of a
clearly identified candidate), and capped expenditures made

39

Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)).
44
45
46
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ture restrictions as direct restraints on speech,"
but viewed contributions as a general expression
of support for the candidate's views:
A limitation on the amount of money a person may give
to a candidate or campaign organization thus involves
little direct restraint on his political communication,
for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor's
freedom to discuss candidates
47
and issues.

In short, while expenditure limits are subject to
strict scrutiny, contribution limits require a "less
compelling justification," 48 and the only justification for upholding contribution limits in Buckley
included preventing corruption or the appear49
ance of corruption of elected officials.
The analytical distinction between contributions and expenditures arises from the notion
that expenditure limits directly suppress not only
the quantity of speech, but also the diversity of
speakers' viewpoints. 50 Because talk is not cheap
within the electoral marketplace, the Court
noted:
[The expenditure restriction] necessarily reduces the
quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the
size of the audience reached .. .[Clommunicatingin to-

day's mass society requires the expenditure of money . .. The
electorate's increasing dependence on television, radio, and
other mass media for news and information has made these
expensive modes of communication
indispensable instruments
51
of effective political speech.

Importantly, Buckley recognized that in 1976,
the only effective modes of mass communication-specifically, broadcast-are expensive
means of reaching viewers and listeners within the
52
political marketplace.
Fourteen years later, the Court took a major
step away from the "quid pro quo corruption" ratioby candidates from his or her personal funds. See former 18
U.S.C. § 608 et. seq. Buckley invalidated these expenditure limits, leaving only the expenditure limits for publicly funded
presidential candidates in tact. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13-15;
see also 26 U.S.C. § 9035 (a).
47 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19, 20-21.
48
Id. at 22.
49
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27 ("To the extent that
large contributions are given to secure political quid pro quo's
from current and potential office holders, the integrity of
our system of representative democracy is undermined.").
50
See id. at 19.
51 Id. (emphasis added).
52
See id.
53 Austin, 494 U.S. at 666-67.
54
See id. at 658-59 (citing FEC v. Massachusetts Citizensfor
Life, 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986) [hereinafter MCFL]); but cf
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794-95
(1977), reh'g denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978) (upholding the right

nale when it held that even under the "fatal in
fact" strict scrutiny standard, Michigan's ban on
corporate independent expenditures-using corporate treasury funds for communications that ad-

vocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate without coordinating with the candidate-did not unconstitutionally infringe on a
corporation's First Amendment rights. 53 Instead,
the Austin Court held that, because of their status
as state-chartered organizations that receive statesponsored economic benefits, corporations
threatened to use wealth obtained in the eco54
nomic marketplace to influence the electorate.
If huge amounts of money could be spent on behalf of candidates, corporations could drown out
the voices of individuals and "distort" the actual
level of public support in favor of the corporation's view. 55 The Court wrote that:
[S]tate-created advantages not only allow corporations
to play a dominant role in the Nation's economy, but
also permit them to use 'resources amassed in the economic marketplace' to obtain 'an unfair advantage in
the political marketplace.'. . . [T]he political advantage
of corporations is unfair because 'the resources in the
treasury of a business corporation.., are not an indication of popular support for the corporation's political
ideas... The availability of these resources may make a
corporation a formidable political presence, even
though the power of the corporation
may be no reflec56
tion of the power of its ideas.'

A few central points arise from Austin. First, in
light of the Court's earlier decisions regarding
corporate political advocacy, it is clear that a corporation's status as a state-created structure does
not by itself determine the scope of its political
speech rights under the First Amendment.5 7 For
example, in FirstNational Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
the Court upheld a corporation's right to make
of corporations to make political expenditures to influence
the outcome of ballot questions).
55 Michigan's campaign finance statutes allow corporations to establish separate political committees that may solicit contributions from a restricted class of corporate employees. MICH. COMP. LAws § 169.255(1), (2) (1976). In this
way, individual employees who wished to speak "through" the
corporation could do so by making a contribution to the corporation's political committee, which could in turn make independent expenditures.
56
Austin, 494 U.S. at 658-59 (citing MCFL, 479 U.S. at
257).
57
In MCFL the court invalidated a rule prohibiting nonprofit corporations from making political expenditures from
treasury funds. See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 255-56. See also CAss
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 238
(1995) ("The tax system is filled with special benefits and incentives for various groups.").

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

direct expenditures in support of or in opposition
to ballot measures and explicitly stated that "the
inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend
upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union or individual." 58

The

Court has also distinguished ideological, nonprofit corporations (that may receive the benefit
of tax exemptions) from business corporations,
invalidating rules that prohibit direct treasury independent expenditures by the former and up5
holding the same restrictions against the latter. '
In short, while business corporations may be prohibited from making direct independent expenditures from treasury funds, the state cannot constitutionally place the same restriction on certain
3
types of ideological, nonprofit corporations. 6°
economic
Austin focused on state-sponsored
benefits that promote and encourage a corporation's aggregation of wealth, in conjunction with
the potential for wealth transfers from the economic marketplace to the political marketplace. 6'
Some scholars refer to this as the "market structuring theory," whereby the Court views "the use
of a corporate treasury to make political expenditures [as] a form of tying-an anticompetitive
practice by which a corporation used leverage acquired from expectations of its profitability in the
financial markets to gain unearned leverage in
the entirely separate market for political influence."a

2

Second, the Court implied that when a corporation wants to engage in independent express advocacy of a candidate, the value of that speech is
58

59
60
61

Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777.
MCIL, 479 U.S. at 246-48.
See id. at 258-61.
In his dissent, Justice Scalia characterized the major-

ity's reasoning as an attempt to "equaliz[e] the relative ability
of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections." Austin, 494 U.S. at 684-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In a
confusing rebuttal, the majority stated that the Michigan law

only "ensures that expenditures reflect actual public support
for the political ideas espoused by corporations." Id. at 660.
Although some corporations may not have accumulated significant amounts of wealth, the majority believed that its rationale was nonetheless valid because those corporations "re-

ceive from the State the special benefits conferred by the
corporate structure and present the potentialfor distorting the political process." Id. at 661 (emphasis added).
Sullivan, supra note 6, at 1659.
62
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not as significant as the speech of individuals. 6 3
On this highly individualist view.., government may be
justified in regulating speech intermediaries when they
depart from the function of reflecting and transmitting
norms ultimately chosen by individuals. If the Michigan

Chamber of Commerce takes money for investment
purposes and spends it for political purposes, there is
reno guarantee that each dollar spent will accurately
64
flect the normative preferences of its donor.

Thus, when the Court engaged in its practice of
constitutional balancing, it determined that the
individual owners "are the ultimate repositories of
speech interests," while corporations are simply
speech intermediaries "with limited delegations
'65
or representational authority.
It is important to note that the majority did not
go so far as Justice Brennan, whose concurring
opinion explicitly protected the rights of corporate shareholders or other individual "owners" by
preventing the corporation from "stealing" their
money to pay for political advocacy. 66 Brennan
would have held that a corporation is merely a
state-created structure composed of beneficial financial interests held by shareholders who have
the right to control (or object to) corporate political advocacy.6 7 "[T]he State surely has a compelling interest in preventing a corporation it has
chartered from exploiting those who do not wish
to contribute to the Chamber's political message.""8
Third, the Court's holding in Austin did not require evidentiary findings that the Chamber (or
its corporate members) did, in fact, amass great
wealth that it planned to use to pay for independent expenditures."9' Nor did it burden the State
court's rationale for restrictions on speech intermediaries:
the "expressive versus nonexpressive" approach; the "content-based versus content-neutral" view; and the "norm-re-

flecting versus norm-creating" view. See id. at 1657-66. While
we do not necessarily adopt her theory, her approach is constructive and relevant to this analysis.
66 Austin, 494 U.S. at 675 (Brennan,J., concurring) ("A's
right to receive information does not require the state to permit B to steal from C the funds that alone will enable B to
make the communication.") (quoting Victor Brudney, Busi-

ness Corporations and Stockholder's Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 Yale LJ. 235-47 (1981)).
67 See id.
68 Id.; see also Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 Loy. L.A.
L. REV. 133, 148-54 (1998) (arguing an alternative justification for preventing this "New Corruption" based on the inappropriate use of shareholders' money in electoral politics by

63

See Austin, 494 U.S. at 659-60.

corporate managers).

64

Sullivan, supra note 6, at 1662.
Id. at 1657-63. Importantly, this analysis merges what

expected to have $140,000 in its separate political fund).

65

Professor Sullivan considers three different theories of the

69

See Austin, 494 U.S. at 658 (finding that the Chamber
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to prove that the expenditure in question-a
newspaper advertisement-would or could "distort" the political dialogue in this particular election by drowning out the advocacy of other politi70
cal players.
As we discuss in detail below, the Austin Court's
refusal to require any supporting evidence will
likely be subsumed by the rule in Reno, which at a
minimum, requires the State to prove that the underlying rationale for restrictions on corporate
political speech remains constitutionally sound
71
when applied to the internet.
III.

APPLICATION OF RENO TO AUSTIN

In our discussion of Reno, we noted that the
Court's internet communications analysis begins
with the recognition that free speech rights are
contextual. Regulations permissibly imposed on
individuals speaking through old media cannot
be applied ipso facto to identical speech exchanged within new media. 72 In the context of

print or broadcast, a state may be justified in banning a corporation's right to make independent
expenditures to prevent its voice from flooding
the political marketplace, but that rationale is seriously questioned in the context of the internet,
where the "volume" or power of political speech
does not depend on gross rating points or the
readership of a full page newspaper ad in the New
York Times.
Austin's greatest weakness is its reliance on the
hypothetical effect of corporate wealth, which,
when deployed, has the power to overwhelm the
electorate. 73 Without requiring proof, the Court
presumed that corporate spending on candidate
advocacy could make it a "formidable political
presence" with an "unfair advantage" in election
contests.7 4 Even in the era of Austin, when print
and broadcast were practically the only modes of
See id. at 660.
The question of evidentiary proof required by the
State to justify its interest in limiting contributions and expenditures has long been in question, but was somewhat refined in Shrink PAC. See Shrink PAC, 120 S. Ct. at 906-07 (rejecting the notion that Buckley required "governments
enacting contribution limits [to] demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural," but distinguishing without enunciating the quantum of evidence required
to justify expenditure limits). In Shrink PAC, the court accepted newspaper articles as evidence to support the state's
70

71

claim.
See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104YALE
LJ. 1743, 1753 (1995) ("What any review of the history of
72

political communication, the factual evidence required to prove a direct correlation between increased expenditures and effective electoral influence "[was] a question whose answer turns upon
formidable empirical problems and troubling
conceptual questions about what constitutes real
communication.

'75

Proving that correlation be-

comes even more difficult in the new media context.
The Reno Court acknowledged that the practical realities of the internet would force it to adapt
First Amendment doctrine to identical speech
made over the internet.7 6 Accordingly, the central
question becomes can the Austin prohibition on
corporate independent expenditures survive
Reno? Arguably, Reno's recognition of the three architectural features of accessibility, interactivity
and parity undermine Austin's basic tenet that
corporate investments in candidate advocacy
promise overwhelming electoral returns.
A.

Access

We begin by assessing how access to the internet undermines the Court's reasoning in Austin. The Court's identification of this internet feature gives constitutional significance to the
medium's architecture. In the context of corporate political speech over the internet, the significance is readily apparent.
The internet's unregulated, open access has
driven down the cost of political speech through
the process of disintermediation, the elimination
of speech intermediaries such as broadcast licensees. 77 In the political marketplace, effective advocacy has historically depended on a speaker's ability to pay distribution costs, such as paper and
postage for targeted persuasive mail or "buying
time" for television and radio spots. Communicating through broadcast or mail means "hitting" unFirst Amendment law should suggest is the contingency of
present First Amendment doctrine.").
7_3 It is important to note that the authors believe an alternative rationale, for example, Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Austin, could withstand Reno because it avoids
the majority's reliance on the effect of wealth spent on behalf
of candidates in the political marketplace. See Austin, 494
U.S. at 669-78 (Brennan, J., concurring).
74 Austin, 494 U.S. at 659 (quoting Shrink PAC, 479 U.S.
at 257-58).
75
76

77

supra note 37, at 1135 n.8.
See Reno at 866-70.
See Sullivan, supra note 6.
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decided voters over and over again, until the message has saturated the targeted voter universe.
Disintermediation within the new media has
broadened the universe of individuals and organizations that can afford to distribute political
messages directly to the intended audience. Persuasion mail no longer requires postage; the
transmission of audio and visual images does not
require the purchase of "time." Today's internet
enables political speakers to engage voters
through interactive, real-time communication
strategies like e-mail "action alerts" or "on-line petitions," which are virtually cost-free. 78 "The cost
of transmitting 2000 bytes (about a page of uncompressed text), even using today's relatively
primitive internet technology, is about one-sixth
of a cent; and local phone calls are already free.
As newer, faster delivery methods come online,
the cost of transmission should fall even below
that of the internet.

7 9

The dramatic reduction of distribution costs attributable to disintermediation has a direct impact on Austin's assumptions about the cost of political advocacy and the ability of any single entity
to inundate this particular political marketplace
of ideas.8 0 The justification for Austin's restrictions on corporate independent expenditures was
built on the Buckley framework.8 1 Buckley held that
money (in the form of contributions and expenditures) should be viewed as a proxy for political
speech; the more money spent, the more speech
that may be purchased and distributed, with the
"reach" and volume of speech amplified by increased political spending. 2 Moreover, because a
corporation potentially has the ability to amplify
its political voice to a volume that threatens to
drown out other speakers, Austin held that the
State could justifiably ban corporate treasury expenditures that promote the election or defeat of
83
a particular candidate.
Austin was correct in so far as it acknowledged
that wealthy corporations could obtain an "unfair
advantage" through traditional mass media be78
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61 (1996);
Cameron R. Graham & Matt Zinn, Cable On-Line Services Update, 578 P.L.I. 673, 692 (Oct. 1999).
79 Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What it Will Do, 104
YALE L.J. 1805, 1821 (1995).
80
See id.; cf Wu, supra note 40, at 1179-80 ("[T] he idea
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that speech is cheap and that all speakers are equally heard
increasingly depends on what application you are talking

about ... [A]s search engines inevitably begin to charge for
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cause they can afford to produce and distribute
political messages. That conclusion is questioned,
however, in the context of new media, where
broad access for all speakers has leveled the cost
of distributing political speech, thereby reducing
the ability of corporations to realize an "unfair advantage." If access to the internet denies corporations the "unfair advantage" present in the use of
other media, the constitutional justification for a
ban on speech is directly called into question.
Our focus on decreased distribution costs due
to broad access is only the first strike against the
Austin rationale. Traditional political advocacy
communicated through broadcast or direct mail
has only the unilateral ability to "push" voters with
a persuasive political message. In contrast, influencing the "virtual" electorate is much more difficult because of an architecture that vests in the
user the ability to "pull" political messages by
searching and selecting issues and sites of interest.
Distinguishing traditional media's "push" capabilities addresses only one side of political communication in today's world. Reno gives constitutional
significance to another feature of the internet: its
"interactivity," that is, the "pull" function that enables user discrimination and control.
B.

"Affirmative Steps" and Interactivity

In the eyes of the Austin Court, the population
of the traditional political marketplace is bifurcated. On one side there are political speakers
who distribute information, including candidates,
political parties, political committees, ideological
groups and media organizations. The other is
composed of "receivers," or individual voters who
collectively make up the electorate.8

4

When a cor-

poration engages in political advocacy, it is acting
as a distributor of information, targeting and influencing the electorate, a passive recipient of its
political views. The specter of a dominating corporate political presence would manifest itself, it
was believed, in the form of corporate-sponsored
priority listings . . . the impact of the stereotypical little person's site will likely continue to decrease. Add to this the increase in competition stemming from the great financial incentives of owning a high-traffic site, and the results look
troubling for high-impact web-based cheap speech.").
81 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 657.
82
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 92-93.
3
See Austin, 494 U.S. at 659.
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candidate advocacy advertisements continuously
repeated before glassy-eyed Americans watching
the nightly news and "Must See TV."
Reno aptly recognized that a new medium has
revolutionized the political marketplace, blurring
the line between active political messengers and
passive voters. The internet's architecture requires the user to take affirmative steps to access
and receive information.8 5 A second related char-

acteristic is interactivity, allowing users to participate in "real-time dialogue."

6

It is easy to see how the concepts of "affirmative
steps" and interactivity diffuse Austin's rationale.
Austin conceptualized a corporation's domination
of the political marketplace by its ability to transmit a substantial volume of invasive political
messages that could communicate directly to the
recipient without interference, effectively silencing other speakers' views.8 7 But as the Reno Court
stated, internet communications cannot be characterized generally as intrusive communications
like radio or television; thus, the ability of a corporation (or any other single speaker) to overwhelm
the electorate is almost impossible s8 Where internet applications can be intrusive, such as junk
and spam e-mail, interactive applications empower the user to block those incoming
messages.8 9 As for political speech in the shadow
of Reno, the Court will likely recognize that the internet's interactive applications empower citizens
by vesting in the electorate the tools to meaningfully participate in political discourse. The "passive" voter has become an active participant in
finding and receiving political and candidate information by downloading polling results from
media websites, taking part in opinion surveys
hosted by a variety of political and nonprofit ideological organizations, contributing money to political candidates and developing home-spun web-

C.

Parity

In conflict with some of Austin's implicit tenets,
Reno recognized that the internet's open access
and user control enhances the relative parity
among speakers and listeners. 91 If the internet's
architecture can truly achieve relative parity, then
in what sense, from the Austin perspective is the
corporation's electoral marketplace advantage
"unfair"?
Parity is an egalitarian construct, cast in consti92
tutional terms as viewpoint or speaker diversity.
Professor Eule points out the tension between the
values of diversity-the "critical demand that the
public be exposed to the widest possible diversity
of views"-and equality-the "precept that speech
may not be suppressed because of the identity of
the speaker," as elucidated in Buckley.9 3 A steady
balance of these two constitutional values does
not necessitate exact government allocation of
free speech rights to particular speakers; it does
not mean "one-person, one-minute" of speech
within the political marketplace. 94 Instead, the
goal is "equalization of 'relative voices,' 'relative
influence,' or the 'relative ability of all citizens to
95
affect the outcome of elections."'
The Reno Court seemed to elevate parity to a
constitutional value that strikes a careful equilibrium between diversity and equality. In short, Reno
recognized that today's new media achieve naturally what the Court and legislatures have artificially attempted through legislation and interpretation. Although websites are hardly equal in
terms of production quality, electronic distribution capabilities or the potential to influence visitors, today's internet architecture and its related
applications prevent market domination by any

sites. 90
See Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
See id.
See Austin, 494 U.S. at 659.
88 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 869.
89 For an insightful approach to internet regulation postReno,,see Wu, supra note 40, at 1174 (arguing that the court's
Reno analysis was unnecessarily broad, and should have been
based instead on the specific function of the application).
90 See GARY SELNOW, ELECTRONIC WHISTLE STOPS, 95, 107,
124-30 (1998).
91 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 863 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 929 F.
85
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after Eule]; see also OWEN Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 16
(1996); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 803 ("the issue is whether a State
may prevent corporate management from using the corpo-

rate treasury to propagate views having no connection with
the corporate business.") (White, J., dissenting).
93 Eule, supra note 92, at 112 ("It is perhaps the height of
irony that in the very same sentence in which the Buckley
Court rejects equalization, it endorses . . . diversity as a central goal of the First Amendment.") (citing Buckley, 424 U.S.

at 48).
94 Id. at 110; but cf Fiss, supra note 92, at 100-01 (arguing in favor of active government intervention in the interest
of speaker and viewpoint equalization).
95
Eule, supra note 92, at 110.
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one individual host. 96 Generally, internet users

reach other users only if they seek out a particular
host or take other "affirmative steps."
As a political marketplace where "relative parity" naturally exists by virtue of its architecture,
the new media's balance of viewpoints is upset not
by the potential for excessive corporate treasury
expenditures for candidate advocacy, but by government rules that absolutely foreclose any person's opportunity to speak or to hear another person's views. Moreover, the evil that the Michigan
prohibition proposes to eradicate, "distorting the
political process and undermining its integrity,"
constitutionally requires at least a modicum of evidence. 97 The medium notwithstanding, Cass Sun-

stein recognizes that "it is doubtful whether restrictions on speech often should be justifiable
[on the marketplace domination theory], at least
in light of the extreme difficulties posed by [the
fact that] no government institution is well-suited
to embark on this sort of inquiry."98 Although its
rationale differed from Austin, Bellotti similarly
contemplated that "Congress might well be able
to demonstrate the existence of a danger of real
or apparent corruption in independent expenditures by corporations to influence candidate elections."99 But the Austin Court required absolutely
no evidentiary showing of corporate domination
or viewpoint distortion within the political marketplace. In light of Reno's strong presumption
that the internet achieves "relative parity among
speakers," 100 the Court's "new media" analysis
96
97
98

See generally Wu, supra note 40.
Austin, 424 U.S. at 668.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 57, at 239.
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might force the government to shoulder a more
significant evidentiary burden.
IV. CONCLUSION
Attempting to apply traditional First Amendment legal standards to internet speech is, as one
scholar has stated, like trying to fit the "stepsister's
foot into Cinderella's glass slipper."' 0 1 Nowhere is
this more evident than in the regulation of political speech.
The internet challenges us to see the First
Amendment not as an impediment to government, but as the embodiment of a particular vision of participatory democracy. Central to that vision is the engaged citizen. The current
architecture of the internet frees individuals from
historic, economic and social restraints on participation. It is that principle the Court appears to be
endorsing in Reno. In so doing, the Court leaves
little room for a robust reading of Austin.
The architecture of the internet is rapidly
changing, so it is with some caution that we argue
that corporate political speech over the internet
will be fully protected, even in light of Reno. From
the merging of the internet with traditional
broadcasting, cable and telephone technologies, a
new architecture will emerge. This new media will
merit the extraordinary constitutional protection
promised by Reno, but only to the degree it realizes its democratic promise.
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